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# ALLIED STRATEGY

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*The comparative calm on the battle fronts during the last few months has been employed by all the belligerents for military preparations on a wide scale, probably to an extent unparalleled in the history of mankind. A new phase in this gigantic war is approaching. We take this opportunity to publish four articles in this issue which, we trust, will aid our readers in appreciating the significance of this moment and the events which are about to unfold.*

*The first of these articles deals with the strategy of the Allies. Their central problem is where to apply the main pressure of their armed forces—against Europe or against East Asia. Hence the slogans of "Europe First" and "Japan First" are among the most popular political terms of the present time.*

*In this article—the first of its kind, we believe—we have traced the story of this paramount strategical problem and its practical application, by collecting and analyzing much scattered material on battles, speeches, conferences, and important appointments.*

## BEFORE AND AFTER DECEMBER 8

Whatever the leading men in London and Washington may have thought in former years about the order in which they hoped to destroy Germany and Japan—the moment the war actually started in Europe, in September 1939, without involving Japan, they adopted a "Europe First" policy. There was no difficulty in agreeing on this as long as the war was confined to Europe. But as soon as war broke out in the Pacific on December 8, 1941, a serious strategical problem arose. In the first few weeks it did not yet become acute. The American and British forces stationed in East Asia were forced to fight back wherever they happened to be, trying to hold what they could. But soon the extraordinary Japanese successes made it quite clear that it was only a question of time before the forces the Anglo-Saxon powers had in East Asia would be overwhelmed.

The Allies, not strong enough to fight a large-scale war simultaneously against two continents, had sooner or later to decide: should all available Anglo-American forces be dispatched to East Asia to stem the Japanese advance, to attempt a reconquest of the areas lost there, and to attack Japan; or should the combined weight of the British and American forces be thrown against Europe in the hope of crushing Germany and Italy, with the intention of turning against Japan only after the accomplishment of this aim?

In speaking of these two alternatives, we do not mean to imply that the choice of one excluded all fighting whatsoever in the other. There had to be a certain amount of fighting both in the European and the Pacific war theaters at the same time, no matter what the decision. *The choice was, not where to fight and where not to fight, but where to concentrate the bulk of the available forces for large-scale actions.*

From the outset there was the possibility of a conflict between London and Washington. For London there was no question but that the "Europe First" policy must be adhered to even after December 8. To concentrate the Allied

forces in the Pacific meant to the British leaders the inviting of disaster to the British position in Europe and Africa. London felt that it could survive the loss of everything except the British Isles, Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal.

For Washington the situation was different. Although, particularly since the *Anschluss* of Austria to Germany in the spring of 1938, the American people had been fed anti-Hitler propaganda in large quantities, the feeling of the Americans as a whole was more anti-Japanese than anti-German. America had no possessions in Europe. But in the Pacific she stood to lose, not only the Philippines and her other island possessions such as Guam, Hawaii, and Samoa, perhaps even the Aleutians, but also her advantageous position in China. Finally, there was the memory of the Pearl Harbor disaster, which inclined the Americans to consider Japan as their Enemy No. 1. (The results of a Gallup poll published on February 24, 1943, showed that 50 per cent of all Americans voted Japan as "America's Enemy No. 1," and 34 per cent Germany.)

### THE FIRST WASHINGTON MEETING

Winston Churchill was probably among the first to realize the danger that might arise from this difference of opinion in the Allied camp. We believe that his decision to fly to Washington less than a fortnight after the start of the Pacific war and to spend a fortnight in America was prompted largely by his desire to use all his personal influence to win over Roosevelt to the continuation of the "Europe First" policy in spite of what was going on in the Pacific.

During Churchill's stay in America, a Supreme Command for the southwestern Pacific was agreed upon in Washington on January 3, 1942, and Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander in Chief of the British forces in India, was appointed its head. This move allayed some of the fears felt in Malaya and the Philippines, in the Dutch East Indies and Burma, in Chungking and Australia, of being left to their own devices. But looking back on the events between the appointment of Wavell and the conclusion of the Japanese conquest of Burma, we know that this was only an empty gesture. The success of Churchill's "Europe First" policy was complete. The southwestern Pacific had been abandoned to its fate. "If we have not got large forces in Burma and elsewhere in the Far East, it is I who am responsible," Churchill frankly stated in the House of Commons on January 27 after his return from Washington.

At the time, few people realized that the First Washington Meeting—as we shall call this first conference between Churchill and Roosevelt after December 8—had resulted in a "Europe First" decision. Churchill was careful enough not to broadcast this fact, knowing what effect it would have on the morale of the armies and nations in the southwestern Pacific. It was Colonel Frank Knox, American Secretary of the Navy, who let the cat out of the bag with one of his frequent careless remarks when, in January 1942, he declared that the policy of the Allies was to "beat Hitler first." His statement immediately provoked a violent reaction, chiefly in Australia and Chungking but also in America. From this moment on, the controversy of "Hitler First" versus "Japan First" has not ceased to agitate the minds of the Allied camp.

### PUBLIC OPINION

The geographical division between the adherents of these two slogans is relatively clear. The British Isles and the American East Coast are for "Europe First," while Chungking, Australia, and the other Anglo-American possessions in the Pacific, as well as the American West Coast, are for "Japan First." The Soviet Union naturally belongs to the "Europe First" camp, and its unceasing public pleas for a second front have all been directed toward the establishment of this second front in Europe. There can be no doubt that Molotov, during his visit to London and Washington in May and June, as well as Stalin, during Churchill's visit to Moscow in August 1942, both stressed the

urgency of a "Europe First" strategy. Least unified is public opinion in the United States. The majority of the press, under the influence of Roosevelt's political machine and the Jews, who are of course all for "Hitler First," advocate Churchill's policy. Yet there are also opponents of this policy, among them Senator Albert B. "Happy" Chandler from Kentucky, Senator Burton K. Wheeler from Montana, and the newspapers belonging to the Hearst concern. They all warn America not to fall for Churchill's bait and fight England's war in Europe, but rather to look after America's own interests which are menaced in the Pacific.

From time to time, events have taken place which, greatly to the relief of Australia and Chungking, seemed to indicate a shift in the Allied strategy toward "Pacific First." But they were invariably followed by disappointment.

April 18, 1942, saw the American air raid on Japan. Nobody imagined at the time that it was the foolhardy stunt which it later turned out to be. On the contrary, many people took it as evidence that the Allies had started a real war against Japan. The fallacy of this assumption, however, became apparent when weeks and months passed without a repetition of the raid. The Second Washington Meeting for which Churchill came to America from June 19 to 24, 1942, revealed that there had been no change in the "Europe First" strategy, although it was temporarily replaced by "Africa First."

### AFRICA FIRST

In his press conference of November 11, 1942, in the first triumph over the successful landing in North Africa, President Roosevelt revealed the following interesting facts. During the First Washington Meeting, he and Churchill had agreed on a frontal attack against Europe across the Channel. But the more the plan was studied the greater appeared the difficulties for its realization in 1942. It was then decided—according to the President, in June 1942—to substitute it by an invasion of North Africa. Apparently the Allied leaders felt that they had to force the Axis out of Africa in order to remove the threat to Egypt and to reopen their Mediterranean life line before they could undertake any move against Europe. Perhaps they also hoped that Stalin might accept their landing in Africa as a substitute second front. This, it turned out later, was not the case, for Moscow's clamor for a second front was not lessened by the events in North Africa. At any rate, the African venture postponed the necessity of attacking Europe itself.

While everything was done after that to prepare the landings in the French colonial empire, some naval engagements took place in the Pacific (First and Second Solomon Battles, Battle of the South Pacific, Third Solomon Battle), all resulting in huge losses for the American fleet. At that time Roosevelt also made some statements which could have been interpreted as indicating his change-over to a "Pacific First" policy. While raising futile hopes in Australia and Chungking, they probably had no other purpose than to divert the attention of the Axis from North Africa.

### CASABLANCA

From the moment the Allied invasion of French North Africa began on the night of November 7, 1942, it became obvious that for a long time to come there would be no chance for "Pacific First." The Casablanca Conference, which lasted from January 14 to 26, 1943, emphasized this fact. Roosevelt and Churchill were careful enough not to include any direct statement referring to their "Europe First" policy in the communiqué of January 27. Indirectly, however, they made it quite clear when they said: "our [Roosevelt's and Churchill's] main objective is to relieve the burden on the Soviet armies as much as possible." If this was their main objective, it could only be attained by throwing all available forces against Europe.

As a result, they continued to strengthen their North Africa armies until these

amounted to about one million men with vast equipment. In the Pacific, however, after three more battles in the Solomons area (off Lunga on Guadalcanar Island, off Rennell Island, and off Isabel Islands), all of which entailed great losses for the US Navy, the naval war lost in size and importance; while the land war (on Guadalcanar, in New Guinea, along the Arakan coast in Burma, and on Attu Island), although strategically important, never assumed the proportions of the first few months after December 8.

In his amazing broadcast of March 21, 1943, Churchill stressed the "Hitler First" policy more sharply than ever before and went so far as to say that, after the end of the war in Europe, Great Britain would demobilize part of her forces because there were many British soldiers who, for physical reasons, could not be employed in the war theater against Japan with its vast distances and poor lines of communication. Thus Churchill practically stated that England's interest in a full-scale war terminated with the restoration of peace in Europe, leaving the burden of the war against Japan to the Americans. The Prime Minister made no mention whatever of Chungking. This speech naturally created a disastrous impression among the Allied partners in Asia and the southwestern Pacific, the more so as Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, declared his full agreement with Churchill two days later. Indeed, the impression created by the broadcast was so alarming that Anthony Eden, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, who happened to be visiting the USA at the time, attempted in a speech in Annapolis on March 26, 1943, to allay some of the alarm.

### THE THIRD WASHINGTON MEETING

From May 11 to 27, 1943, the Third, and so far last, Washington Meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt took place. It brought the number of days which Churchill spent with Roosevelt since the start of the Pacific war up to 47 (First Washington Meeting 14 days, Second Washington Meeting 7 days, Casablanca 10 days, Third Washington Meeting 16 days). Once again the question of "Europe First" was among the chief topics of their conversation. Watching its sons fall on the battlefields of North Africa, sensing the approach of an invasion attempt against Europe with the terrific losses it would entail, and feeling that the advantages which America could derive for herself from the establishment of a second front in Europe were most doubtful, the American nation became more and more openly skeptical of the wisdom of the "Europe First" policy. Roosevelt had to take this American sentiment into consideration. Hence he refrained from any statement on future policy in that by now famous one-sentence communiqué of May 28 which read: "The recent conference of the combined staffs in Washington has ended in complete agreement on future operations on every front."

"That's all I have for you, boys." Stephen Early, President Roosevelt's secretary, is reported to have said apologetically to the disappointed journalists after reading the communiqué at an evening press conference in the White House.

The strategic result of the Third Washington Meeting has been kept a carefully guarded secret. One might even say that everything was done to confuse the world about the real outcome of the conference. Churchill himself made contradictory statements. On the one hand he declared in a press conference at the White House that the war would be waged "with the same vigor on both fronts"; on the other hand, in his speech before the US Congress on May 19, he emphasized the urgency of aiding the USSR, dampened the hopes for an attack against Burma, and promised England's support of the USA against Japan only "when the time is ripe."

On the whole, commentators were inclined to agree that once more Churchill's "Europe First" had triumphed. The near future will probably show whether they were correct in this. A serious attempt to invade Europe would auto-

matically relegate the Pacific war theater to second place, although it might allow the sending of planes to Australia and Chungking and the carrying out of some "publicity offensives" in the Pacific.

### THE MATTER OF COMMAND

Strategic decisions are very closely linked with appointments to important military commands. In this respect the picture offered by the war against Europe is far clearer than that in the Pacific.

Outside of the British Isles, the Allied armies are concentrated in two areas: North Africa and the Near East. The armies in North Africa have as their Commander in Chief General Dwight Eisenhower (American), those in the Near East General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (British). The naval commanders in these areas are Admiral Sir Andrew Brown Cunningham, in charge of naval operations in the Mediterranean, and his cousin, Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham, in charge of those in the Levant. Commander in Chief of all US troops in the European war theater is Lieutenant General Jacob Devers. In one respect the absence of clarity and co-ordination is still evident: as yet no Allied commander in chief for the European war theater has been appointed.

### RAPID TURNOVER

The many conflicting views about the strategy to be employed in the Pacific were reflected in the changes in the command of this area, changes which present the picture of an amazing chaos.

As we have said before, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed on January 3, 1942, on a Supreme Command in the southwestern Pacific, with Sir Archibald Wavell as its head. Simultaneously, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN, was appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied naval forces in that area. This situation was maintained for only a few weeks. Vice-Admiral Helfrich, since 1940 Commander in Chief of the Dutch naval forces in the Netherland East Indies, took Admiral Hart's place on February 10, since the latter was killed in action during the battle of the Java Sea on February 4. But Vice-Admiral Helfrich was deprived of a good deal of Admiral Hart's powers, as the Americans and British were reluctant to put their naval forces under the Netherlander. Hence it was decided to organize a new command for the naval forces of the Australian and New Zealand area (the "Anzac Area"), to which Vice-Admiral Herbert F. Leary of the US Navy was appointed. Even what remained of the southwest Pacific was no longer under Vice-Admiral Helfrich's full control; for Washington decreed that Rear Admiral Glassford, Commander of the US naval forces in the southwest Pacific, "would physically direct operations at sea while Vice-Admiral Helfrich would direct them from shore," as the Navy spokesman declared in Washington on the day Vice-Admiral Helfrich took over his new post. In addition to this, there were also Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who had been appointed Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet following the dismissal of Admiral Kimmel after the disaster of Pearl Harbor, and Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth, since May 22 Commander of the US Fleet in the southeast Pacific.

Nor was General Wavell in full control. Washington explained that his authority was limited to tactical decisions, while all strategical plans were to be elaborated in London and Washington. "Two committees above Wavell!" the Batavia newspaper *Javabode* wrote in despair on February 9, 1942. General Wavell did not enjoy his command very long. On March 2, when the fate of the Netherland East Indies was sealed, he was returned to India and replaced by a Dutch general. The latter lasted only a few days, until the Dutch forces capitulated, and on March 17 General MacArthur took his place.

### THREE COMMITTEES

Finally, numerous committees were to spring up in London and Washington to make the life of the commanders on the spot miserable and to prevent clarity of purpose and action.

On January 27, 1942, in a speech before the House of Commons after his return from the First Washington Meeting, Churchill announced the creation of "Pacific War Councils" in London and Washington as well as the formation of a "Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee" in Washington.

The Pacific War Council in London consisted of representatives from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Netherland East Indies (but not from Chungking). It was to deal with the entire Pacific situation and to be assisted by the British Chiefs of Staffs Committee in London. It met for the first time on February 10, 1942, with Prime Minister Churchill in the chair.

The Pacific War Council in Washington, which met for the first time on April 1 with President Roosevelt in the chair, had a larger membership. While also including representatives from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the Dutch East Indies, it lacked a representative from India but had representatives from Chungking and Canada. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest personal adviser, participated in the Council as a member of the "Munitions Assignment Board"—another invention of the Allied war bureaucracy. The first meeting of the Pacific War Council in Washington, lasting ninety minutes, was widely publicized; newsreel and news photographers took pictures.

The Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee met in Washington for its first session on February 14, 1942. It included the American Secretaries of the Army and the Navy and the Chiefs of the US Army, Navy, and Army Air Force, as well as some ranking British military and naval representatives. From the outset this committee was faced by criticism on the part of the Dominions, the Dutch East Indies, and China. They were disappointed at not being included and felt apprehension at the fact that, as a result, the supreme strategy of the war was exclusively in American and English hands. To allay these fears, a representative of the Australian Army was admitted to the committee and left for America on April 1.

The relationship between the Pacific War Councils in London and Washington and the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee in Washington remained entirely unclear, except for a statement in the *New York Times* on April 1, according to which the Pacific War Council in Washington was to dominate the one in London, which latter was to act "as a kind of liaison office between Washington and London." The chaos resulting from such top-heavy bureaucracy had its share in bringing about the long series of Japanese successes in the Pacific. It seems to us noteworthy that in none of these three Allied strategic committees are there any representatives of the USSR to be found.

During the past months, less has been heard of these various organizations. As time went on, it proved necessary to give more authority to the men on the spot and to curtail the power of the Councils and Committees in faraway London and Washington. As far as the southwestern Pacific is concerned, these men on the spot were primarily MacArthur, Nimitz, and Halsey.

### "MACNIMSEY"

On March 17, General Douglas MacArthur, the Commander in Chief of the American and Filipino forces in the Philippine Islands, left Corregidor by plane prior to its capture by the Japanese and was appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in those portions of the southwestern Pacific which were still in Allied hands, i.e., primarily Australia. He was severely handicapped in his duties by the fact that the Allied naval forces in the southwestern Pacific were under the independent command, first of Vice-Admiral Leary, then of Vice-Admiral Robert Lee Ghormley and, on October 25, 1942, after his recall owing to his failures in the Solomon Islands, of Vice-Admiral William Halsey. Vice-Admiral Halsey in turn had to consider the wishes of Admiral Chester V. Nimitz, the supreme commander of the Allied naval forces in the entire Pacific with the exception of

the United States West Coast and Alaska. Thus, although Vice-Admiral Halsey had the "tactical command," the "strategic command" was in the hands of Admiral Nimitz.

The Australian press invented the name "MacNimsey" from syllables taken from each of these three names. But even this compound name could not conceal the difficulties arising from so complex a leadership. In the middle of last April, MacArthur and Halsey met for several days to clarify the issue of command. Almost a whole month passed before, on May 14, 1943, news of this meeting was published. The reports seemed to indicate that MacArthur had won and that henceforth his command was to supersede that of Halsey. However, the statements were so confused that the clamor for a unified command in the south and southwest Pacific has not ceased.

While all this was going on in the Allied camp, the Japanese rapidly developed the far-flung arc of their outer defenses in which they had established themselves in the spring of 1942. It runs from Burma through Malai, Sumatra, Djawa, Timor, New Guinea, and the Bismarck Archipelago to the Marshall Islands and Ohtori Shima (formerly known as Wake Island). No wonder that the "Europe First" strategy found its most severe critics in Australia and Chungking. Their reaction throws much light on the strategy of the Allies.

### AUSTRALIA AND "EUROPE FIRST"

When it became clear that Churchill and Roosevelt were pursuing a "Europe First" policy, Australia reacted immediately with signs of disappointment and pleas for reconsideration. It is easy to imagine how Australians must feel when Japanese planes fly over their territory while they are reading books like *Victory Strategy*. This book was written by America's outstanding military commentator, Hanson Baldwin of the *New York Times*, and appeared in April 1942. After explaining that Hawaii, Alaska, and the Aleutian Islands must, of course, be kept intact, he continues:

> But when it comes to the question of Australia, and only Australia, I would place her in the category of secondary importance in the strategic sense. Australia to Asia is as western Africa to Europe. In other words her strategic importance is much less than that which is attached to the British Isles, Hawaii, Midway, Alaska, the Aleutians, India, the Soviet Union, or Chungking. If I am permitted to say so frankly, I would rather give up Australia . . . . The fact that Australia has deserts both in the north and in the south, which virtually cut off communications with the interior, makes her defense so difficult as to demand the need of an enormous quantity of shipping.

Books could be filled with quotations from the Australian press and radio, showing how the Australians have been trying to influence London and Washington ever since that first blow of Colonel Knox's "Hitler First" statement in January 1942; and there is no end to the cartoons repeating ideas similar to the one expressed in a cartoon of the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* (23.3.43): Ridiculing Churchill's broadcast of March 21 ("some time next year—it may well be the year after—we might beat Germany"), the cartoon shows a gigantic Japanese soldier, standing with one foot in China and the other in New Guinea, while a tiny Australian shakes his fist at him saying, "You just wait (till year after year after next)!"

### THE "HOLDING WAR"

It was this same Churchill broadcast which finally proved to Australia the futility of her attempts to change Churchill's mind. At first the reaction was almost one of despair. It was impossible to conceal the disappointment and alarm. But at the same time the Australian leaders realized that they could not allow their people to remain in this gloomy and perplexed state of mind, and they began to search for some formula which would make the situation more understandable to the Australians. So they invented a new slogan—the "holding war." In a speech made on March 25, Prime Minister Curtin gave to understand that hope of diverting Churchill and Roosevelt from the "Hitler First" policy had to be abandoned, and added: "Whether we like it or not, we shall essay a

'holding war' against Japan for some indefinite period. This period has every indication of being protracted." A week later, in an address at a Liberty Loan rally, he stated :

"Australians must realize that they face a long struggle—a struggle that must last longer than the struggle in Europe. The augmentation of forces in the Pacific, necessary for a defeat of Japan, cannot come before Hitler's defeat. Australia is facing a prolonged war without interruption, week by week, month by month, for two, three, or more years. I put it before the Australians solemnly and pitilessly that it requires the whole strength of the Allies to defeat Hitler. The less concentration of Allied forces there is in Europe the longer the war will last. All we can do is to hold on with all our strength, whatever the sacrifice. If in the meantime and prior to Hitler's defeat, Australia should go down, the war would be still more prolonged because it would deprive the United Nations of any base wherefrom to wage war against Japan."

### A NEW LINE

From then on the Australian Government changed its policy in London and Washington. Resigning itself to the impossibility of altering the "Europe First" decision, it adopted a new line. "We realize that you are not going to send us armies or navies for the time being, so we do not ask for that any more," it said in effect to Roosevelt and Churchill. "But if you want us to be able to continue our 'holding war' with the forces available in Australia, we need one thing absolutely—more planes."

Bearing messages of this kind, Dr. Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister, Lieutenant General Kenny, Commander of the Allied Air Force in the southwest Pacific, and Major General Sutherland, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, were sent to Washington. And, to back up their pleas, a broadside was fired in the direction of Washington from the three biggest guns in Australia. On April 14, Prime Minister Curtin, General MacArthur, and General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander of the Allied land forces in the southwest Pacific, delivered speeches all to the same effect, namely, that the danger of a Japanese attack against Australia was very great, the concentration of Japanese troops, planes, and ships in the area north of Australia more alarming than at any time before, and the need for more planes imperative.

### WASHINGTON'S ANSWER

Colonel Knox, US Secretary of the Navy, countered the plea from Australia with the charge that the speeches of April 14 had greatly exaggerated the danger threatening Australia and that, according to the best information at the Government's disposal, there was no indication of any large naval concentration of the Japanese in the waters north of Australia.

Colonel Knox's statement, which was tantamount to calling Curtin, MacArthur, and Blamey liars, immediately caused a flare-up. The Australian press rallied behind its leaders, while in America public opinion was divided and for the first time an anti-MacArthur wave swept through the press of the USA. Here is an example, quoted from an editorial in the *Chicago Sun* :

[General MacArthur] is causing the American public to lose confidence in the joint Chiefs of Staffs, against whose major strategic decisions he appears to be protesting. . . . There is nothing in the course of events to indicate that these men should be deprived of their commands or subjected to a hostile publicity campaign by a subordinate. And let MacArthur remember that before he instructs his spokesman again to contradict Colonel Knox.

During the last few weeks Prime Minister Curtin and his supporters made a number of more hopeful statements, in the effort to create the impression that the Third Washington Meeting had finally shown proper understanding for the needs of the Pacific war theater. Curtin never failed to add that this favorable turn was the result of his own statesmanship. Since, however, the Australian elections are probably to be held this autumn, this sudden optimism would seem to be nothing but an election maneuver.

The attitude of New Zealand was on the whole similar to that of Australia, with one difference, however. Not feeling themselves directly menaced as yet by a Japanese attack, the New Zealanders have shown a rather provincial complacency toward world politics.

### CHUNGKING

In order to understand Chungking's feelings toward the strategy of London and Washington, one must bear in mind that the Chungking leaders have stood alone in a serious war lasting almost six years. When the Pacific war broke out, Chungking's first reaction was one of joy over the fact that it had now gained two vast empires as allies in its struggle against Japan. It expected that Japan's pressure would be noticeably lessened as she would have to fight America and Great Britain, and Chungking even dreamed that the Allies would crush Japan. However, the opposite occurred, and Chungking quickly found itself infinitely worse off than before the outbreak of the Pacific war. Instead of finding relief through the active entry of the Anglo-Americans into the war, Chungking had to send its own troops to assist them in Burma, with the result that its divisions there were also drawn into the vortex of the British defeat. And this was not all. Before the Pacific war, Chungking had received supplies from the Anglo-Saxon countries via Burma and southeastern China. The Japanese conquest of Hongkong and Burma completely closed these doors, leaving only the air route from India to Chungking open.

At first Chungking tried to console itself with the thought that this adverse development was only temporary, that the Allies would soon recover from their blows and hit back at Japan. Instead, the heaviest blow of all came: the realization that the Allies were determined on a "Europe First" policy. When it was first formulated by Colonel Knox a few weeks after the outbreak of the Pacific war, Chungking immediately protested. On January 18, Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, declared at a press interview:

"If Britain and the United States intend allowing Japan a free hand in East Asia, as advocated in recent speeches made by leading Anglo-American statesmen, with a view to finishing the fight in Europe first, grave doubts exist in our minds as to the advisability of our continuing to resist Japan."

### SECOND ORPHAN

Still Chungking hoped that the words of Colonel Knox had expressed the opinion of one man only. The faked reports about the American air raid on Japan created the illusion that America had finally started her offensive. But when no further raids followed, and the first raid was gradually reduced to its true proportions, increased gloom descended on Chungking, until the Casablanca Conference left no doubt that the "Europe First" policy had won out. The lack of spirit with which the Burma campaign along the Arakan coast was carried out by the British forces between December 1942 and April 1943 and its disastrous end confirmed to Chungking its sad isolation.

Chungking's reactions to this disappointing development were very similar to Australia's. Both are orphans of the Pacific, and both have used almost identical arguments and methods in their desire to reverse the "Europe First" decision. They have even repeatedly pointed out to the world the other orphan's plight, thereby hoping to increase the Allies' attention to their own. Thus, on May 6, the Chungking *Central Daily News* wrote: "The position of Australia is serious. Australia is Japan's immediate objective, and the menace to Australia cannot be overlooked. Australia's appeal for more help should not fall on deaf ears."

Like Australia, Chungking sent its representatives to plead for aid. Among them were Madame Chiang Kai-shek, General Hsiung Shih-hui, and Foreign Minister T. V. Soong. The plea was always for a "third front" and for material aid through the reopening of the Burma Road; and no opportunity was missed by Chungking to impress the Allies, particularly America, with the disastrous consequences which the absence of aid was bound to bring.

### SURPRISES

In view of the constant repetition of this demand, it was a slap similar to that given to Australia by Colonel Knox in April when President Roosevelt, in his

speech opening the new session of Congress, declared on January 7, 1943: "The United States is sending Chungking by air as much material as she was sending when the Burma Road was open." Chungking's comment on this statement was "surprising" and "amazing." But as the truth could be disclosed only by publishing hitherto carefully guarded secrets, there was nothing Chungking could do about it.

Roosevelt's statement did not stop Chungking's clamor for more aid. Nevertheless, approximately at the same time as Australia, Chungking also began to show signs of resigning itself to the "holding war." But, like Australia, it did not abandon its incessant demands for more planes. Even in this modest hope, however, Chungking has so far been disappointed. In March 1943, at a New York meeting in honor of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, General H. Arnold, Commander in Chief of the US Army Air Force, explained America's inability to satisfy Chungking's desire for planes for the time being. He gave many reasons and pointed out that, to maintain 400 bombers and 100 fighters in air bases in China, 75,000 tons of gasoline a month as well as large amounts of bombs and arms would be necessary. In order to supply by air this amount of gasoline alone, General Arnold explained, more than 1,000 four-engined large-sized transports would have to be operated more than 12 times a month.

The fact that, in the first half of 1943, seven Chungking generals have gone over with their troops to the National Government, is a sympton of the reaction of the Chungking adherents to the policy of their allies.

* * *

The development of the war up till now has shown that the Allies have not been strong enough and did not possess enough ships to conduct large-scale operations against both Europe and East Asia. Whether they ever will be strong enough for this is more than doubtful. America's military strength, it is true, is still on the increase, although the rate of increase is declining; but that of Great Britain seems to have reached its zenith some time ago, while both Germany and Japan are adding to their strength every month. Japan, in fact, has only started to mobilize the huge resources of her new empire.

Thus the Allies still have to choose between "Europe First" and "Japan First". Neither choice is attractive to them. If they concentrate on Europe, they allow Japan to consolidate her power still further, and vice versa.

Hitherto the Allies have clearly followed a "Europe First" policy. This, we believe, was the result of pressure coming from London and Moscow and of the fear that an all-out war against Japan would give Germany a free hand in Europe and might cause the USSR (or even England) to drop out of the war. To keep the Red Army in the war is of paramount importance to Roosevelt and Churchill. In fact, Allied strategy so far can almost be reduced to the formula: do everything to let the Reds do ninety per cent of the fighting.

If Roosevelt saw himself compelled in this respect to follow a policy not altogether popular in his country, one need not feel too sorry for him. He knows how to look after his interests. Thus the "Europe First" strategy has resulted in his growing influence in Australia and in the establishment of what practically amounts to an American protectorate over large parts of Africa.

Surveying the chaotic story of Allied strategy in the first eighteen months since Pearl Harbor, one cannot but notice the contrast offered by the strategy of the Axis. This strategy is clear and convincing. For the Axis, no such perplexing alternatives exist as "Europe First" or "Pacific First". While Japan is building Greater East Asia, Germany and Italy are consolidating Greater Europe. Each success of one Axis partner automatically benefits the others, as both ends of the Axis are not only fighting against the intrusion of Great Britain and the USA into their spheres but are also preparing for the decisive counterattack against the Allies.